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FOREWORD 
Understanding the nature of the world food system has been a major 
objective of IIASA's Food and Agriculture Program (FAP), since it began in 
1977. 
Scholars from different nations have worked together in the FAP. 
The interactions of scholars from many different nations and perspec- 
tives sometimes reveal preconceptions regarding systems one is not 
fully familiar with. And often this provides interesting questions for 
fresh analysis. 
This paper on efficiency of socialist cooperative agriculture is one 
such example of such analysis. The questions posed here were raised in 
discussions when a group of FAP scholars from different nations visited a 
cooperative farm in Hungary. In this paper the authors have advanced 
some hypotheses to explore the reality behind the apparent comparative 
inefficiency of socialist cooperative farming. 
Kirit S. Parikh 
Program Leader 
Food and Agriculture Program. 
The authors  wish to  thank Odd Gulbrandsen and Janos Hrabovszky 
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EFFlCIENCY OF SOCIALIST COOPERATTVE FARMING: 
APPEARANCE AND REALI?TY 
Ckaba Csaki. Airit Parikh and Laszlo Zeold 
Cooperative farms provide members of t he  cooperative with private (fam- 
ily) plots in a number of socialist countries in Eastern Europe. I t  is also gen- 
erally believed tha t  t he  value added from the private plots on a per hectare 
basis f a r  exceeds the value added per hectare from the cooperatively cultivated 
land. For example, in  Hungary a typical cooperative has about  700 members 
and  operates around 5000-6000 hectares of land, of which 500-600 hectares  are 
operated a s  household plots by the members, but about 25% of the total value of 
products comes from private operations. Even in the Soviet Union where such 
small holding agriculture is now being encouraged, similar differences in out- 
put  per hectare between private and  cooperative land are reported. 
From this, the western economists have a tendency to  conclude t h a t  
private farming is much more efficient and tha t  if only all farming were made 
private, socialist agriculture would produce much more. But to what extent is 
such a conclusion valid? Such a conclusion implies tha t  the household's opera- 
tions of the  private plots and operation of the cooperatives a re  independent. 
However, in reality the  two sectors operate in a complementary fashion. More- 
over, when government control upon cooperatives is implemented by economic 
means  the cooperative's management would t ry  to and  be able to  maximize the 
welfare (income) of the members of t he  cooperative. which depends on the total 
income obtained from both the  cooperatively operated land and  the  private 
operations. Thus allocation of products to exploit comparative advantages and 
transfer pricing to avoid taxes (just as  in the  case of a multi-national company 
with production plants in two countries) may be expected. Such a behavior 
could explain a large part  of the obserued diflerences in productivity. 
Large scope exists for both profitable product specialization a s  well as  for 
giving hidden subsidies through accounting practices such as  the  way in which 
overhead and charges for marketing, veterinary services, etc., are  allocated. 
Private households concentrate on animal husbandry operations. This provides 
an opportunity for the  cooperative to save on investments in buildings needed 
for livestock operations, particularly where many farmers have homes with 
some provision for keeping livestock. And of course, t he  livestock sector is 
particularly suited to provide hidden subsidies through provision of feed, veteri- 
nary services and marketing facilities. Moreover, t he  economies of scale are 
stronger  in  crop production than in livestock operations (once the  buildings are 
taken care of) and this also suggests tha t  t h e  cooperatives concentrate on crop 
production. On the whole t h e  household plots of the cooperative members can 
be regarded as  an integral part  of the  large scale enterprise and the inter- 
relations between the  collective and household farms in the  a rea  of production 
and sale a re  an extension of large-scale farms, e.g, production inputs, and 
animals for feeding are supplied to  the small scale farms on a cost basis. Pro- 
ducts a re  marketed by the  cooperatives on a contract basis and extension ser- 
vice is supplied by the large scale farms. 
It  is our  contention tha t  for those centrally planned countries where the 
indirect type of government economic management is applied, and cooperative 
management is democratically elected (secret ballot) as well as where 
appropriate policies exist to  motivate private households to  seek additional 
incomes, such an explanation is closer to  reality. 
We propose to  explore this issue through a se t  of programming models of a 
cooperative farm with household plots and agricultural activities. We will stipu- 
late alternative objective functions and then examine the  optimal solution to 
assess incomes per hectare accruing to  the members of the cooperative from 
private holdings and from cooperative farming. We will also explore the range 
of incentives needed to  ensure vigorous operation of private plots. For this pur- 
pose we take a typical cooperative farm in Hungary. 
INSITWTIONAL SET UP OF HUNGARIAN COOPERATIVES 
Before we describe the model i t  would be useful to look a t  the  institutional 
set-up of Hungarian cooperative farms. (In 1983 about 1300 cooperative farms 
were operating in the country). The cooperatives in Hungary a r e  business 
enterprises and social institutions a t  the same time. Their independence is 
quite large in both areas. As enterprises the  cooperatives have full decision 
making authority in  their  activities. Government control is implemented by 
indirect tools, operating mainly through incentives. 
In general, for the  Hungarian cooperatives quantitative targets of output 
a re  not prescribed by the central planners. Their performance is sought to  be 
directed through indirect means of prices and taxes, and other policy instru- 
ments, such a9 interest  and credit  policy, subsidies, etc. The cooperatives 
cover their  expenses from their  re turns  and accumulate diverse funds. For- 
mally the compensation fund for labour provided by members, which is the 
source of personal income was established as  a residual after deducting costs of 
materials, taxes, and other  obligations from returns. The residual was distri- 
buted according to the  total of the  so called "work units". A t  present the 
cooperatives pay guaranteed monthly wages which are s e t  a t  about 00% of 
expected income. A t  the end OF t he  year, a n  additional bonus amounting to  6- 
20% of the  guaranteed sum of their  wages is distributed among t h e  workers. 
This share depends upon the  financial performance of the enterprise. 
The management of the cooperatives is based on the principles of so called 
"self management". The assembly of the members is the highest decision mak- 
ing authority. Both the Board of Directors and  the President-the chief execu- 
tive of t h e  farm--are secretly elected from among members for a fixed te rm by 
the members. 
Prices of outputs and inputs are  se t  by the  central price controlling 
authorities or for some commodities are determined by supply-demand rela- 
tions. A cooperative is subject to the  following taxes: 
(a) Iand tax 
(b) Income tax on "clear" income: clear income is here defined as  follows: 
- Net Value Added = Gross Revenue - Current Inputs - Depreciation 
- Clear Income (before tax) = Net Value Added - Wages 
In order to promote investment the tax ra te  on clear income i s  a decreas- 
ing function of the investment/clear income ratio. 
Tax on the increase in members' income from the cooperative: to prevent 
avoidance of income tax through increasing wages and bonus and also to 
keep personal income increases under control, not only the income tax 
ra te  increases when average income from the cooperative increases com- 
pared to the  previous year, but also an extra tax has to be paid when 
income increases exceed a certain specified level 
(d) Labour remuneration tax Paid according to wages as a contribution to 
social security expenditures 
(e) Production tax: Levied on the value of the industrial and other non- 
agricultural activities performed by the farm. 
In addition, the cooperatives pay contributions towards local municipal develop- 
ment .  The clear income of the cooperative farm is allocated as per  the deci- 
sions of the members. Various funds such a s  investment, social and  cultural, 
reserve funds and funds for homes are formed and are influenced by the taxa- 
tion system mentioned above. Private household income is also subject to 
income tax  when income exceeds a certain level. However, in  practice such tax 
is rarely paid, as the tax free allowance is relatively high. Such potential 
income from transfers of intermediate inputs provides scope for creative tax 
management by the cooperative through product specialization and cost alloca- 
tions. 
THE MOD= 
The se t  of models we have used was developed on the basis of an LP model 
used for 5-year planning purposes a t  an existing Hungarian cooperative farm. 
The 5-year planning model with a detailed description of the farm and the 
results of the various model runs  were published as an operation research case 
study in Hungary, Csaki and Meszaros (1981). 
The cooperative farm under study is located in the  North-Eastern region of 
Hungary. The farm operates on an area of 5881 hectares (3500 hectares  of 
arable land. 40 hectares of orchard, 1020 hectares grassland and 521 hectares  
of forest), and has a membership of 677 persons The natural conditions a t  the 
fa rm are worse than the Hungarian average. Out of the 3500 hectares  arable 
land, 464 hectares are  used as  the  members so-called household plots. 
Based on the  actual Hungarian model, three models have been constructed 
for our investigation: 
1. Model for the  optimization of the large scale part  of the cooperative 
farm: Large Scale Model (LSM): 
For this model we have used two alternative versions of the objective func- 
tion: 
BM/l: maximization of clear income after tax (gross revenue - 
current  inputs - depreciation - taxes paid*) 
B M / 2  maximization of net  value added after tax, (clear income 
after tax plus wages**) 
- - 
*Tax payments are calculated on a simplified basis 
*COn the Hungarian cooperative farms a certain payment for workers is guaranteed by the 
government. %is is considered as labour costs in our case. Additional payments (bonus or 
income share) is also usual at the end of the year kom the net income. 
2. Model for t he  independent optimization of t he  local household and 
private agricultural activities: Household Model (HM) 
7'he ob jec t ive  func t i on  here describes the maximization of gross value 
added (gross value of production minus production expenditures 
without labour costs) 
3. Model for the  joint optimization of t he  large scale and household agri- 
cultural activities a t  the farm: Cooperative Model (CM) 
The objective function here is maximization of the sum of ne t  value 
added after tax of the  large scale and gross value added in the  house- 
hold sectors of the  farm 
The Lurge Scale Model includes: 
- 1 0 6  var iab l e s :  20 variables represent the  options in field crop production, 
16 variables a re  related to the utilization of grassland, orchards and forest. 
The animal husbandry is represented by 25 variables. One variable 
expresses the  aggregated construction and non-agricultural activities of 
t he  farm. The rest of the  variables a re  related to  resource utilization 
(manual labour and machinery requirements) t he  planning of new invest- 
m e n t  in machinery and in buildings and the financial results of the  farm- 
ing. 
- 1Z1 cons t ra in t s :  The first group of constraints of the  LSM a re  related to 
the  availability of physical resources and the pat terns of their  utilization. 
Another group of equations describes t h e  feed balances and the internal 
relations of animal husbandry. The use of manual  labour and t h e  rules of 
crop rotation are also described. 
lb Household Model optimizes the  s tructure of the  private producing activities 
of the  cooperative members on the basis of the 464 hectares land endowment. 
The household farming is treated in this model as a fully independent opera- 
tion. A s  available labour force in this area, the  non-working members and  those 
employed in other  sectors are  alsp considered (618 persons with two hours per 
day). The HM consists of: 
- 14  var iab l e s :  10 various production activities (wheat, barley, corn, plum, 
dairy cattle,  beef cattle, pig with sow. hog, poultry for meat  and eggs) are  
included and the  financial results a r e  also expressed by independent vari- 
ables. 
- 2 1  c o n s t r a i n t s  which express building capacities and availability of labour 
and feed balances. The formation of financial results are also described 
here.  
7he Cooperat ive  Model includes both H M  and LSM for the joint optimization of 
the cooperative farm. In this case the  largest possible support for household 
farming and the availability of t he  additional labour force are assumed. Goods 
and services supplied for household farms by the large scale farm a re  calcu- 
lated on a cost  basis, as  is the practice in Hungary. The model consists of: 
- 121  var iab l e s  - 142  c o n s t r a i n t s  with the s tructure described above. 
THE RESULTS 
Results of the  various runs  can be seen in Table 1. 
As can be expected comparing columns 7 and 4 we see tha t  the  cooperative 
model CM yields a value added of 81.6 million H.Ft which is 26 percent higher 
than the value added of 64.8 million H.Ft under separate optimization. More- 
over, total gross value of product a t  230.8 million H.Ft under CM is larger by 24 
percent than the 186.4 million H.Ft worth of gross value of product tha t  can be 
realized when both large scale and household farms carry out separate optimi- 
zation. What is, however, striking is tha t  increase in the gross value of product 
as  well as  in value added for the household operations under the  CM are  both 
nearly 2.5 times their values under the  HM. This income is mainly due to the  
enlarged feed availability offered by the large scale part  of the farm. On the  
other hand, the gross production of the large scale part  can also be increased 
due to enlarged labour availability. 
The total income of the members of the cooperative would consist of three 
components; gross value added in the household operations, wages received 
from the cooperatively managed large scale operations and the bonus received 
from the after tax clear income. Even assuming that all after tax clear income 
is distributed as  bonus, under joint optimization the total income of the 
members is 67.7 mHFt (13.3 + 27.3 + 27.1) compared to  55.7 mHFt under 
separate optimization, an increase of 21.5 percent. Of course, in practice, not  
all after tax clear income can be distributed as  bonus because when bonus 
exceeds a certain amount it will be liable to  additional taxes. Thus the  gain in 
total income under joint optimization will be larger than the 21.5 percent 
increase calculated above. 
It is also interesting to  compare the  gross value of product per hectare 
under different runs. As mentioned earlier, out of the total arable land area of 
3500 hectares the  cooperative manages 3036 hectares and the household plots 
add up to  464 hectares. The gross value of product per hectares under LSM 2 
and HM are 55764 HFt for the  cooperative and 36853 HFt for the  household 
plots. These are  somewhat comparable figures and in any case do not show tha t  
households are more productive. In fact they show the  advantages of large 
scale crop production practiced by the cooperative. However, under  CM, the 
gross value of product per hectares  is 61732 HFt for the cooperative land and 
90302 HF't for the household plots. Thus if one were to  compare only these 
figures one would wrongly conclude tha t  household agriculture is more produc- 
tive than the cooperative large scale agriculture. In comparing the results of 
the various runs, changes in the  s tructure of production have also t o  be taken 
into account. The enlarged feed supply available on a cost basis for the  
members shows the extension of poultry and beef production a t  the household 
sector; while in the  HM run households could have purchased feed grains from 
the market at the  substantially higher market prices. The changes in the crop- 
ping s tructure are a consequence of the different feed requirements due to  
changes in the s tructure of livestock production. At the large scale part of the 
farm the  additional labour force makes i t  possible to enlarge animal husbandry 
(cattle and  sheep operations). 
The most strildng change in the  s t ruc ture  of production under joint optim- 
ization i s  the substantial increase in poultry for eggs in the  households. House- 
holds in column 6 have 8000 layers compared to 190 in column 3. One may 
wonder why in egg productions, where economies of scale may be strong, pro- 
duction by households is preferred. The explanation lies in the fact t ha t  house- 
holds do not make special investment in  buildings for poultry (many may have 
spare space in their ~ a r d s ) ,  and  tha t  they do not pay the same taxes as the  
Table 1. Production Structure  and Incomes of a Farming Cooperative with Household Opera- 
tions Under Alternative Management Regimes 
Cooperative Model 
CM 
Large scale Large scale Large scale 
with rnax. with m a .  Household and household 
clear income net value added alone together 
LSM/ 1 LSM/2 H M (2) + (3) Large-Scale Household Together 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. Gross value of product 
in million H.R. 155.4 169.3 17.1 186.4 188.9 41.9 230.8 
2. Direct Ehpenditms 
Without Labour Coats 
inmillionH.R. - 08.8 109.9 11.5 120.9 125.1 28.6 153.7 
3 Valued Added* in 
million H.Ft. 56.8 59.4 5.4 64.8 63.8 13.3 81.6 
4. Wages Paid in 
million H.Ft 21.8 24.3 24.3 27.3 27.3 
5. Clear lncome in 
million H.Ft. 34.8 35.1 35.1 38.5 36.5 
8. Taxes Paid in 
million H.Ft. 5.7 9.1 9.1 9.4 8.4 
7. Clear lncome After Tax 
in million H.Ft. 29.1 28.0 26.0 27.1 27.1 
PRODUCTION STRUCTURE 
1. Wheat-Barley(ha) 
2. Corn(ha) 
3. Sunflower(ha) 
4. Hay-Green Feedba) 
5. Rapepa) 
8. Grasslandpa) 
7. Orchard(ha) 
8 Davy Cattlebead) 
9. Beef Cattle(head) 
10. Sheepbead) 
11. Pig-Sow(head) 
12. Pig-Hog(head) 
13 Poultry for Eggsbiece) 
14. Poultry for MeatCpiece) 
'Net for cooperative and gross for household 
cooperatives. By giving feed and day old chicks to the  households the coopera- 
tive can expand production without additional investments, and can increase 
personal incomes without paying wage related taxes. These advantages com- 
pensate the losses of foregoing the  benefits of economies of scale. This shows 
the advantages of integrated planning of t he  cooperative and household opera- 
tions. 
If the managers have authority upon the s t ruc ture  of production and are 
democratically elected they a re  likely to work to maximize the total income of 
the members of the cooperatives. When compulsory targets  are  given For pro- 
duction and managers a re  appointed by central authorities, their obligation 
would be to the  planners. They would therefore be more likely to maximize 
their performance a s  it would be evaluated by the cent ra l  planners, namely by 
maximizing clear income of the  cooperative after tax. Column 1, gives the 
results of LSM/l under such behavior. This gives the lowest gross valu.e of pro- 
duct as also value added but indeed highest clear income after tax. 
To conclude, we believe tha t  these runs demonstrate one main contention: 
When members a r e  given small household plots and when manage- 
ment  has  freedom in making farming decisions and is elected demo- 
cratically socialist cooperative farms plan the operations on the 
cooperative land and household plots in a complementary fashion, and 
in their effort to maximize the welfare of their members an illusion 
may be created that  household plots a re  more productive. 
Csaki, C., and S. Meszaros (Editors). Operation Research Methods for Farm Deci- 
sion Making (in Hungarian), Mezogozdasdgi Kiad6 Budapest. 1981. 
